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Tobacco Manufacturers and the United States
Government: Ready for Battle
Brian E. Mason*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tobacco has been a fixture throughout world history, dating back to
"the Mayans and other Native Americans [well] before Christopher Colum-
bus brought... nicotiana seeds and leaves from the New World to Europe.",
Tobacco had been used "in many different forms for hundreds of years with
[minimal] health effects" until the introduction of "the golden leaf' in the
nineteenth Century.2 The introduction of the cigarette became overwhelm-
ingly popular, but with its popularity came many concerns over its health
effects.3 There have been six identifiable stages in the development and pop-
ularity of the modem cigarette: "the invention of flue curing, a fermentation
process ... allowing for the production of a bright yellow tobacco leaf that,
when smoked, could be [inhaled] into the lungs without coughing;" the in-
vention of safety matches; the development of the Bonsack rolling machine,
which allowed for mass production of cigarettes; the distribution among
soldiers in the First World War to assist with "relax[ing] the mind and
calm[ing] the spirit;" the growth of mass consumer marketing; and govern-
ment recognition of cigarettes as a dependable source of tax revenue.4 All of
these can be viewed as playing a role in explaining why, in 2004, there were
about 5.5 trillion cigarettes smoked.5 Little doubt exists that eight years later,
in 2012, this number is even higher.
Today, tobacco smoking can be ominously awarded the title of the
"leading cause of preventable death in the world."6 Every year, about five
million people across the world die from tobacco-related diseases.7 These
staggering statistics piqued the interest of different parties to reduce the
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1. Robert N. Proctor, The Global Smoking Epidemic: A History and Status Re-




4. Id. at 372-73.
5. Id. at 371.
6. David M. Erceg-Hurn & Lyndall G. Steed, Does Exposure to Cigarette Health
Warnings Elicit Psychological Reactance to Smokers?, 41 JOURNAL OF AP-
PLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 219, 219 (2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/10. 111 1/j. 1559-1816.2010.007 10.x/pdf.
7. Id. In 2006, the World Health Organization equated this to one person dying
every 6.5 seconds.
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
smoking rate.8 In an effort to educate consumers about the damaging health
effects of smoking, numerous countries throughout the world require text-
only or graphic health warnings on cigarette packages.9 The United States is
one of those countries. The passage of the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act ("Tobacco Control Act") represents a major step by the
United States government towards regulating the tobacco industry.lO How-
ever, the Tobacco Control Act forced many major cigarette manufacturers to
fight the constitutionality of the new regulations.It
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. Health Consequences of Tobacco and Cigarettes
Smoking has become one of the most commonly adopted habits of mil-
lions of people all over the world. Everywhere you look, it is easy to spot
someone using some sort of tobacco product. Since the introduction of to-
bacco, there have been questions surrounding the health effects of its use.
Today, smoking in the United States takes the lives of more than 400,000
Americans per year.' 2 Even more troubling, more than five million people
worldwide lose their lives every year because of smoking.13 Research
reveals that approximately 46.6 million United States adults are cigarette
smokers.14 Even more alarming is the fact that about 46.3 percent of today's
youth in grades nine through twelve have tried a cigarette, and just fewer
than twenty percent of that same group regularly smoke cigarettes.15 Studies
show that these numbers will only continue to increase over time.16 Accord-
ing to the 2008 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, "2.4 million Amer-
icans aged twelve or older smoked cigarettes for the first time in the past
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act ("Tobacco Control Act"),
Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
11. See generally R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C.
2011) (mem. op.), vacated, Nos. 11-5332, 12-5063, 2012 WL 3632003 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 24, 2012).
12. Matt Shechtman, Comments, Smoking Out Big Tobacco: Can the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act Equip the FDA to Regulate To-
bacco Without Infringing on the First Amendment, 60 EMORY L.J. 705, 707
(2011).
13. Id.
14. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements ( "Final Rule"),





2012] Tobacco Manufacturers and the United States Government 557
twelve months."17 In 2011, over one million members of that same group
began smoking cigarettes on a daily basis within the last twelve months.18
These numbers become more troubling when taken in context with the
knowledge discovered over the years about cigarette smoking and its health
effects. Simply looking at the poisons included in a single cigarette explains
why smoking can have such dire consequences. A single cigarette holds "ap-
proximately 10 mg of soot, tar, ash, phenols, benzpyrene, hydrogen cyanide,
formaldehyde, and radioactive polonium 210," all of which is drawn into the
lungs.19 Smoking is the leading cause of lung cancer, and it can lead to many
other dangerous diseases like "heart attacks, chronic obstructive lung disease,
emphysema, cancers of the lip, tongue, larynx, and pharynx," and other
problems, including bladder cancer and blindness.20 In the United States,
tobacco-related deaths are more common than "all the deaths from human
immunodeficiency (HIV), illegal drug use, alcohol use, motor vehicle inju-
ries, suicides, and murders combined."21
When comparing smokers to non-smokers, the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention estimates that smoking increases the risk of coronary
heart disease by two to four times, stroke by two to four times, men develop-
ing lung cancer by twenty-three times, women developing lung cancer by
thirteen times, and dying from chronic obstructive lung diseases (such as
chronic bronchitis and emphysema) by twelve to thirteen times.22
Smoking is also known to negatively affect reproduction and early
childhood development by increasing the risk of "infertility, preterm deliv-
ery, stillbirth, low birth weight, and sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS)."23
The loss of life and diseases related to tobacco also created a significant
economic impact.24 Yearly, tobacco-related illness in the United States costs
around $193 billion in lost productivity and health care expenditures.25
B. Regulating the Tobacco Industry
The significant health consequences and financial implications from
smoking and tobacco have created awareness and promoted activity in gov-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Proctor, supra note 2, at 371.
20. Id. at 372.
21. Health Effects of Cigarette Smoking-Smoking & Tobacco Use, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, available at http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/




24. Shechtman, supra note 13, at 707.
25. Id.
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ernments all over the world, including the United States. For over a century
there have been different avenues taken to try to reduce smoking. During the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, cigarette bans significantly reduced
tobacco use.26 However, once the bans expired and mass marketing became
prevalent, the demand for cigarettes and tobacco immediately returned.27
Across the globe, governments have started restricting certain areas in which
smoking is prohibited.28 There has also been a rise in counter-advertising to
cigarette and tobacco use in order to deter people from using.29 One of the
most important ways that both the United States and other countries have
tried to reduce cigarette and tobacco use is through the use of taxation.30
This has been a relatively effective tool based upon a simple idea-people
are less likely to spend money on cigarettes if they cannot afford to do So.31
The United States has long recognized the negative health effects of
tobacco use and has tried over the last century to regulate it. The Food and
Drugs Act of 1906 was the first attempt by Congress to regulate the health
and safety of the American public.32 The Food and Drugs Act was similar to
previously passed state food regulations that focused on accurate product la-
beling.33 However, it also included provisions applicable to drugs.34 The
Bureau of Chemistry, a division within the United States Drug Administra-
tion ("USDA"), was responsible for the enforcement of the Food and Drugs
Act.35 In 1927, the Bureau of Chemistry was renamed the Food, Drug, and
Insecticide Administration before being shortened again to became the now
well-known Food and Drug Administration ("FDA").36 "IT]he FDA was
later transferred from the USDA to the Federal Security Agency, which
[later] was renamed the Department of Health, Education and Welfare."37






32. Regulator) Information: Legislation, U.S. FDA, available at http://www.fda.
gov/Regulatorylnformation/Legislation/default.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2012);
see also Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1934) (repealed in 1938 by 21 U.S.C.
§ 329(a)).
33. Marc T. Law, History of Food and Drug Regulation in the United States, Eco-
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After twenty years of enforcement, Congress decided to reevaluate the
Food and Drugs Act in an effort to pass stronger legislation. After an exten-
sive legislative battle, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act ("FFDCA") in 1938, replacing the Food and Drugs Act and more
clearly defining the scope of the FDA's authority over medical devices and
drugs.38 The FFDCA provided the FDA with greater influence over the food
and drug industry,39 requiring them to make certain that "all drugs and de-
vices are safe and effective." 40 As health experts and scientists began realiz-
ing the negative health effects of tobacco, Congress became even more
proactive by passing the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
("FCLAA"), trying to regulate the tobacco industry.4' "Since the FCLAA's
inception, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) exercised its regulatory au-
thority over cigarette labels and imposed restrictions on claims, while enforc-
ing mandatory Surgeon General's warnings on packaging."42
Regulating the tobacco industry and trying to raise awareness of tobacco
usage has also been a top priority for the FDA for a very long time. For
nearly a half-century, promoters of anti-smoking legislation have been in an
ongoing dispute in the legislature.43 In 1996, the FDA attempted to regulate
tobacco products under the FFDCA by classifying cigarettes "as restricted
drug-delivery devices in an attempt to reduce the exposure and influence of
tobacco on the nation's adolescents. '"44 David Kessler, former Commissioner
of the FDA, is a major advocate of allowing the FDA to regulate the tobacco
industry.45 Kessler took the stance that since nicotine is an addictive sub-
stance, it should be viewed "as a drug and cigarettes as the delivery vehicle,"
thereby allowing the FDA to regulate tobacco under its statutory
framework.46
Unfortunately for Kessler and the FDA, the United States Supreme
Court did not agree.4 7 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., the
38. Shechtman, supra note 13, at 708.
39. Law, supra note 34.
40. Shechtman, supra note 13, at 708.
41. Id.; see Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("FCLAA"), Pub. L.
No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1341 (2006)).
42. Id.
43. Jeremy R. Singer, Note & Comment, Taking on Tobacco: The Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 34 NoVA. L. REV. 539, 541 (2010).
44. Shechtman, supra note 13, at 709-10.
45. Gregory D. Curfman et al., Editorial, Tobacco, Public Health, and the FDA,
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Court, in a five-to-four opinion, held that the FDA does not have the author-
ity to regulate tobacco under the FFDCA.48 Although the Court recognized
the seriousness of tobacco use in the United States, even acknowledging that
"tobacco use.., among children and adolescents[ ] poses perhaps the single
most significant threat to the public health in the United States," it could not
find a valid grant of power from Congress to the FDA to regulate tobacco. 49
However, on June 22, 2009, Kessler's goal of FDA regulation of the tobacco
industry came to fruition when President Barack Obama signed the Tobacco
Control Act into law.50
The Tobacco Control Act, which passed in the House by a vote of
307-97 and in the Senate by a vote of 79-17,51 finally gave the FDA the
power to set regulatory policies in the tobacco industry.52 This allowed the
FDA to regulate "how tobacco products are manufactured, marketed, and
sold to consumers."53 The ultimate goal and purpose is to "curb tobacco use
by adolescents," while "continuing to permit the sale of tobacco products to
adults."54
The passage of the Tobacco Control Act did not come without criticism.
Many industry experts criticized both the bill and the FDA's role in regulat-
ing tobacco because of the enormous burden that was placed on the FDA.55
Other opponents of the bill believed further regulation would just end up
costing taxpayers more money. 56 Politicians opposing the Tobacco Control
Act also argued that the FDA did not have adequate resources to efficiently
regulate the tobacco industry.57 Mitch McConnell, Senate minority leader,
commented, "Mandating the FDA to regulate and approve the use of tobacco
would be a distortion of the agency's mission and a tremendous misuse of its
48. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
161 (2000); Curfman, supra note 46, at 402.
49. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161.
50. Curfman, supra note 46, at 402; see Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
123 Stat. 1776.
51. Singer, supra note 44, at 540.
52. Scott J. Leischow et al., Guest Editorial, Research Priorities and Infrastructure
Needs of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Science to
Inform FDA Policy, 14 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RESEARCH, no. 1, 2012, at 1.
53. Id.
54. Tobacco Control Act §§ 2(6), 3(2), 3(7).
55. Singer, supra note 44, at 544-45.
56. Id. (quoting Shari Roan & Shara Yurkiewicz, FDA Unfiltered: Tobacco Indus-
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overstretched priorities. We should focus FDA resources on protecting the
public health, not burdening it with an impossible assignment."58
Even supporters of the Act knew that this was going to be a big respon-
sibility for the FDA. Rep. Henry A. Waxman, the chairman of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee and author of the bill, acknowledged that
this is an unusual role for the FDA, but he believed that the FDA is the only
agency capable of taking on the challenge of limiting and reducing tobacco
use in the United States.59 Waxman stated that "[tihe FDA is the exact
agency that should have that authority-it's a scientific organization with
regulatory powers."60 The Tobacco Control Act includes eight main
requirements:
Restrictions on tobacco marketing and sales to youths. 61
General restrictions on tobacco marketing-"The Secretary of Human
Health Services (HHS) has the authority to develop regulations that impose
restrictions on the advertising and promotion of tobacco products consistent
with and to the full extent permitted by the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion."62 This requirement "directs the FDA to reissue regulations requiring
that labels and advertisements for tobacco products include only black text
on a white background with no graphics."63
Tobacco companies are now required to provide "detailed disclosure of
[the] ingredients, nicotine and harmful smoke constituents" found in their
products, allowing the FDA to better determine how to educate the public
and reduce the harm caused by tobacco products.64
The FDA has the power to require changes to tobacco products to pro-
tect the public health.65 However, the FDA cannot ban tobacco outright or
eliminate its most addictive ingredient, nicotine.66
58. Id. (quoting Halimah Abdullah, Senators Who Opposed Tobacco Bill Received
Top Dollar from Industry, MCCLATC-Y NEWSPAPERS (June 12, 2009), http://
www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/06/11/69925/senators-who-opposed-tobacco-bill.
html).
59. Melissa Healy, The Tobacco Law: What the FDA Can and Can't Do, L.A.
TIMES, June 29, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/29/
health/he-tobacco29.
60. Id.
61. Leischow, supra note 53, at 2.
62. Id.
63. Tobacco Control Act § 201(a) (adopting 21 C.F.R. § 897.32(a)); Common-
wealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 521 (W.D. Ky.
2010) (mem. op.), affd in part, rev'd in part, Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery,
Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
64. Leischow, supra note 53, at 2.
65. Id.
66. Healy, supra note 60.
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The FDA has the authority to regulate "reduced harm" claims made by
tobacco manufacturers about their tobacco products to make sure the claims
are not misleading or inaccurate. 67
The Tobacco Control Act "[lr]equires bigger, bolder health warnings;"
labeling requirements can be revised by the FDA "based on the best available
science without new action by Congress."68 Specifically, the Tobacco Con-
trol Act requires that cigarette packaging have updated warnings that occupy
50% of the front and rear panels of the packaging and that include "color
graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking to accom-
pany the label statements." 69
Necessary funding is provided for the FDA "through a user fee on man-
ufacturers of cigarettes, cigarette tobacco and smokeless tobacco."70
Other state and local governments are not restricted "from enacting
other tobacco control measures."71
As a whole, the Tobacco Control Act allows the FDA to regulate to-
bacco products and the tobacco industry under an extremely broad public
health standard.72
HII. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Since the passage of the Tobacco Control Act, there has been uproar
among cigarette manufacturers and certain political activists. In recent years,
three major developments have impacted federal regulation of the tobacco
industry, all of which have created a whirlwind among the courts, the FDA,
Congress, and cigarette manufacturers. These developments, all dealing with
the constitutionality of the Tobacco Control Act, are likely to push this issue
in front of the United States Supreme Court in the next couple of years.
A. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States73
The passage of the Tobacco Control Act sent shockwaves through the
tobacco industry and some of the world's largest cigarette manufacturers. It
was not long before cigarette manufacturers challenged the constitutionality
of the Tobacco Control Act. On Monday, August 31, 2009, five of the larg-
67. Leischow, supra note 53, at 2.
68. Id.
69. See Tobacco Control Act § 201(a). Similar warnings are required to cover
30% of the two principal display panels for smokeless tobacco products.
§ 204(a).
70. Leischow, supra note 53, at 2.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1.
73. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512.
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est tobacco manufacturers in the United States7 4 filed a complaint against the
FDA seeking to block enforcement of various provisions of the Tobacco
Control Act.75 They filed suit in a federal district court in Bowling Green,
Kentucky,76 claiming the Tobacco Control Act violated their First Amend-
ment right to free speech.77 They also claimed it violated the Due Process
and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment.78 Although most of the largest
tobacco manufacturers in the United States were plaintiffs in the lawsuit, one
was notably not: "Altria, the nation's dominant tobacco maker with the Marl-
boro brand," did not participate in the suit and was the only tobacco manu-
facturer to support the Tobacco Control Act.79
Before the case was heard in the Bowling Green federal district court,
speculation mounted among the FDA, cigarette manufacturers, and the ad-
vertising industry on the importance and likely result of the lawsuit. One of
the lawyers representing Lorillard, Floyd Abrams, stated, "The case will be
about whether Congress has gone too far about preventing tobacco compa-
nies from communicating with adults, and keeping adults from receiving the
information that tobacco companies want to send to them."80 Abrams ac-
knowledged that "[t]he government has [the] power to protect children ...
from cigarettes, but tobacco is a legal product for adults," and, "[w]hen you
cut back [cigarette companies'] ability to speak to their potential lawful pur-
chasers, you do start running into serious legal issues."81
Not everyone agreed with Abrams' assessment of the case. Richard A.
Daynard, a professor at the Northeastern School of Law in Boston and then
chairman of the law school's Tobacco Products Liability Project, said, "It
was perfectly clear there was going to be a constitutional challenge, and I
think it will survive the challenge."82 Clifford E. Douglas, a lawyer and the
executive director of the University of Michigan Tobacco Research Network,
agreed with Daynard, stating: "If there's any commercial speech that it is
74. See id. at 512. The five tobacco manufacturers include Commonwealth
Brands, Inc.; Conwood Co., LLC; Lorillard Tobacco Co.; National Tobacco
Co., L.P.; and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. The other plaintiff, Discount To-
bacco City & Lottery, Inc., is a retailer of tobacco products.
75. Shechtman, supra note 13, at 712.
76. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 512.
77. Id. at 519
78. Id.
79. Duff Wilson, Tobacco Firms Sue to Block Marketing Law, N.Y. TIMES, at B 1,
Aug. 31, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/business/0 1
tobacco.html?_r=-1.
80. David Kesmodel et al., Tobacco Giants Challenge Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125174788118073575.html.
8 1. Duff Wilson, supra note 80.
82. Id.
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
constitutional to restrict, it's the type of marketing covered in this legisla-
tion."83 The advertising industry was also interested in the result of the law-
suit, as attested to by Dan Jaffe, executive vice president of the advertising
lobby, who noted that the case "is extremely significant" to the advertising
industry and that they would be watching very closely.84
Once the litigation began, there were cross-motions for summary judg-
ment on the various claims made by the plaintiffs.85 The plaintiffs chal-
lenged the constitutionality of eight major provisions under the Tobacco
Control Act when the court issued its original order on January 5, 2010.86
Before addressing the constitutionality of the eight provisions, the court ex-
amined the appropriate standard of review to be applied.87 Both parties
agreed, with the exception of two provisions, that the Supreme Court's re-
quirements set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Ser-
vice Commission of New York must be applied and satisfied when a statute
seeks to regulate commercial speech under the First Amendment.8S In com-
mercial speech cases, courts apply a four-part analysis.89 First, the court de-
termines whether the speech falls under the purview of the First Amendment
by examining whether it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.90
When commercial speech does not accurately inform the public about lawful
activity, it has no protection under the First Amendment and may be regu-
lated.91 On the other hand, if it does accurately inform the public, the court
will look to whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.92 If the
government interest is substantial, the court then looks to the final two parts
of the analysis to "determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary to serve that interest."93
1. Ban on Color and Graphics
The first provision at issue in the court's opinion addressed the Tobacco
Control Act requiring only black text on a white background with no graph-
83. Id.
84. Kesmodel, supra note 81.
85. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
86. Id. at 512 (order amended Jan. 14, 2010).
87. Id. at 520-2 1.
88. Id. at 520 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)).






2012] Tobacco Manufacturers and the United States Government 565
ics for cigarette and tobacco labels and advertisements.94 This provision also
included two narrow exceptions: magazines that advertise to only adults and
advertising in adult-only facilities, like tobacco shops.95 The court deter-
mined that Congress's central idea when banning color and graphics was
because "[c]hildren are more influenced by tobacco marketing than adults."96
Since the use of tobacco among adults is lawful, the court found that regulat-
ing tobacco advertising and labeling aimed at adults is a lawful activity under
the first prong of Central Hudson.97 The court also found that preventing
tobacco use among youth is a substantial government interest and that the
provision's restrictions directly advanced that interest-satisfying the second
and third prongs of Central Hudson.98
The court's focus then shifted to whether the commercial speech restric-
tions were "more extensive than .. necessary to serve that interest." 99 The
court held that Congress could have selected larger categories of harmless
images and colors, "such as images that teach adults ...how to use novel
tobacco products, images that merely identified products and producers, [or]
colors that communicate information about the nature of the product."10 The
resulting "'blanket ban' on all uses of color and images" was unconstitu-
tional because it had "a uniformly broad sweep ... demonstrat[ing] a lack of
tailoring."0
2. Brand-Name Event Sponsorship
The plaintiffs also challenged the "regulations . . . prohibit[ing] the
sponsorship of athletic, social, and cultural events 'in the brand name' of a
tobacco product."102 The purpose of the provision is to prevent tobacco use
from being "associated with exciting, glamorous, or fun events such as car
racing and rodeos."103 The court examined the Master Settlement Agree-
ment, which allowed tobacco companies that were signatories one brand
94. Commonwealth, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 521-22 (citing Pub. L. No. 111-31,
§ 201 (a)(2)).
95. Id. at 522 (citing Tobacco Control Act §§ 102(a)(2), 201(a); 21 C.F.R.
§ 897.32(a) (1997)).
96. Id. at 523 (citing Legislative Findings 15).
97. Id. at 520.
98. Id. at 523-25.
99. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
100. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 525-26. The plaintiffs argued that
they were unable to even "communicate important commercial information
about their products" like "images of packages .... simple brand symbols, and
some use of color" under the Tobacco Control Act. Id. at 525.
101. Id. at 526 (quoting Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001)).
102. Id. (quoting Tobacco Control Act § 201(a)(2)).
103. Id. (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 44,527) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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name sponsorship each year, which is defined as 'a single or multi-state se-
ries or tour.104 The problem with the Master Settlement Agreement, accord-
ing to the court, was that tobacco companies were indirectly appearing on
television through event sponsorship.10
Thus, the provision under the Tobacco Control Act demonstrated Con-
gress's view that the Master Settlement Agreement was no longer ade-
quate.1 06 The court ultimately held that there could be no exception for adult-
only facilities with sponsorship advertising because of the constant growing
media coverage and imagery that makes it ultimately impossible from reach-
ing adolescent viewers.107 As a result, the plaintiffs' argument that the provi-
sion could have achieved its goal by restricting less speech was rejected, and
the provision regulating the prohibition of tobacco sponsorship under the To-
bacco Control Act is constitutional.108
3. Brand-Name Merchandise
Congress used the enactment of the Tobacco Control Act to reissue reg-
ulations that prohibited tobacco manufacturers from selling items like "caps,
t-shirts, and sporting goods that bear the name or logo of a tobacco brand."109
Congress believed that branded merchandise depicting tobacco products cre-
ated a false belief among adolescents that smoking is widely accepted and
normal."10 The plaintiffs did not agree; instead, they believed the ban on
tobacco-branded merchandise was "more extensive than necessary because it
'prohibit[ed] them from marketing their products on any promotional
items,"' even though they might only be tailored to an adult audience.' The
court disagreed with the plaintiffs' perspective.l12 Citing Congress's federal
regulations, the court stated that, "[t]here is no way to limit the distribution of
these items to adults only.""l 3 Therefore, even if all the merchandise was
only provided to adults, they would inevitably turn themselves into "walking
advertisements," creating the perception that tobacco use is widely ac-
104. Id.
105. Id. at 527.
106. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
107. Id. at 524.
108. Id. at 526-27.
109. Id. at 527; see Tobacco Control Act § 201(a).
110. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 528 (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 44,526)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Ill. Id. at 527 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 528.
113. Id. at 527-28 (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 44,526) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cepted."14 As a result, the court upheld the provision prohibiting tobacco
manufacturers from distributing brand-name tobacco product merchandise.5
4. Authorization of "Further Restrictions"
When Congress passed the Tobacco Control Act, it made clear they
were "further authoriz[ing] federal agencies, state and local governments,
and Indian tribes to enact even 'more stringent' regulations."1I6 The plain-
tiffs interpreted this authorization as an improper delegation of legislative
power because the statute did not provide any guidance for those entities. 117
The court found the provision constitutional because it did not authorize ad-
ditional restrictions, but instead told federal agencies, state and local govern-
ments, and Indian tribes that Congress and the FDA would not prevent them
from construing their own restrictions.,i1
5. Tobacco Product Warnings
One of the most controversial and heavily discussed provisions of the
Tobacco Control Act is the newly mandated graphic warnings that must be
included on cigarette packages. The new warnings must "occupy the top
50% of the front and rear panels of packaging and include 'color graphics
depicting the negative health consequences of smoking to accompany the
label statements.' Similar warnings, occupying 30% of each of the two prin-
cipal display panels, are required for smokeless tobacco products.""19 The
plaintiffs believed the warning requirements to be unconstitutional based on
two cases: Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regu-
lation, Board of Accountancy120 and Entertainment Software Association v.
Blagojevich.12 They relied upon these cases in framing their three different
arguments.
First, the plaintiffs argued that the warnings were not justified "be-
cause . . . the Government cannot 'point to any harm that is potentially
real' . . . that these 'warnings' are needed to remedy," as required under
Ibanez.122 The plaintiffs believed consumer ignorance regarding the health
114. Id. at 527-28.
115. Id. at 528.
116. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 528; see Tobacco Control Act
§§ 101(b)(3) (adding 21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(l)), 203 (adding 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334(c)).
117. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 528.
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Tobacco Control Act §§ 201(a)(2), 204(a)).
120. Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512
U.S. 136 (1994).
121. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
122. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (quoting Plaintiffs' Brief 45).
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risks of smoking was the only harm and that both adolescents and adults fully
aware of these risks.123 The court quickly pointed out that the plaintiffs'
argument rested on the assumption that, since the public was already aware
of and understood the health risks, the government is simply beating consum-
ers over the head about tobacco's negative health effects. 124 Instead, the
court determined that the government was simply trying to make sure that
consumers actually see the health risk message, while relying upon numerous
studies to support its conclusion that the new required warnings were
justified.125
The plaintiffs next claimed that the new warnings were more burden-
some than necessary and that their speech would be "'completely drown[ed]
out' by the government's message" because of the overwhelmingly large
amount of space that the warnings required.126 The plaintiffs relied upon
Entertainment Software as an example of a video game cover that required a
warning that took up one-twentieth of the cover, but was struck down as
unconstitutional because it was subjective and highly controversial.27 How-
ever, the court drew a distinction between the two cases: "[u]nlike Entertain-
ment Software, where the state failed to give any reason for why a smaller
warning would be inappropriate," Congress gave specific reasons for the new
warning requirements.128 For example, Congress heavily relied upon the in-
ternational consensus reflected in the World Health Organization's Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control, which requires warnings to be
rotating; "large, clear, visible, and legible;" cover more than "50% of the
principal display area," but "no less than 30%;" and include warnings using
123. Id. (quoting Plaintiffs' Brief 45-46).
124. Id. at 530.
125. Id. at 530-32. The Surgeon General, in 1994, reported that empirical studies
reveal that warnings are given little attention by viewers. Id. at 530 (citation
omitted). In 2007, the Institute of Medicine concluded "that the 'basic
problems with the U.S. warnings are that they are unnoticed and stale, and they
fail to convey relevant information in an effective way."' Id. (citation omit-
ted). A magazine study revealed that "more than 40 percent of the people ex-
amined did not even view the warning," while 20 percent acknowledged
looking at the warnings, "but failed to actually read it." Id. (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the Institute of Medicine report
cited many studies of textual warnings on the side of packages that indicate
"low levels of salience among smokers." Id. at 530-31 (citation omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 529-30.
127. Id.; see Entm't Software, 469 F.3d at 652.
128. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
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pictures.129 Congress also relied upon Canada's approach that nearly identi-
cally reflected the new warnings provided for under the Tobacco Control
Act.130 As a result, the court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the
new warnings are too large.13
Finally, the plaintiffs contended that strict scrutiny must be applied like
in Entertainment Software instead of applying the Central Hudson standard,
because the case was "not a case mandating publication of 'purely factual
and uncontroversial information.' "132 The court did not agree. 33 In En-
tertainment Software, the government required a very subjective and contro-
versial message that the game was sexually explicit on the outside of certain
video games. 34 Here, Congress's message is objective. and has been stable
over the years.135 Textual warnings like "WARNING: Cigarettes are addic-
tive," or "WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children," are warn-
ings known for many decades, and the court believed that the addition of
graphic images would not alter the substance of the general messages.136 Be-
cause the court struck down all three of the plaintiffs' arguments, it con-
cluded that the new warning requirements are "sufficiently tailored to
advance the government's substantial interest under Central Hudson."'137
6. Modified-Risk Tobacco Products, Claims Implying FDA
Approval, and the Ban on Outdoor Advertising
The plaintiffs challenged three other provisions of the Tobacco Control
Act. One of those provisions concerned modified-risk tobacco products "as
applied" and as a "prior restraint" on the plaintiffs' right to free speech under
the First Amendment.138 The court determined that the "as applied" provi-
sion did not implicate the First Amendment, the "prior restraint" provision is
not a viewpoint-based restriction, and that "[n]on-manufacturers are free to
express the ostensibly-suppressed viewpoint, and even manufacturers may do
so after their product is approved for the purposes for which it is intended to
129. Id. (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORG. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO




132. Id. at 530 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme
Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
133. Id. at 531.
134. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531; see Entm't Software, 469 F.3d
at 652.
135. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
136. Id. at 531-32.
137. Id. at 532.
138. Id.
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be marketed."139 Because of this, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of the government on the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the
modified risk tobacco products provision.140
The plaintiffs also claimed that the ban on discussing the FDA's regula-
tion of the tobacco industry was unconstitutional.14, The court found that the
ban applied to more than just commercial speech.142 Therefore, the provision
required strict scrutiny analysis.43 Since the government did not attempt to
justify the ban, the court found it facially unconstitutional.'"
Finally, the plaintiffs challenged the ban on outdoor advertising as indis-
tinguishable from the Massachusetts ban struck down by the Supreme Court
in Lorillard.145 Although the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs were
correct, it concluded that the case was not yet ripe because Congress in-
structed the Secretary to make any necessary modifications to the provision
in light of First Amendment considerations. 146
7. Reaction to Commonwealth Brands
When Judge McKinley, Jr., of the Western District of Kentucky, issued
the Commonwealth Brands opinion, it received mixed reviews from both the
tobacco industry and supporters of the Tobacco Control Act. The Washing-
ton Legal Foundation ("WLF"), a public interest law and policy center, filed
a brief supporting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and viewed
the opinion as a partial victory.147 Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the WLF,
felt as though "[t]he district court improperly ignored Supreme Court prece-
dent that prohibits the government from imposing speech restrictions as a
first resort. The Supreme Court has stated unequivocally that the Constitu-
tion requires government to turn restrictions on truthful speech as a last re-
sort, not-as here-as a first resort."' 48
139. Id. at 532-34.
140. Id. at 534.
141. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 534.




146. Id. at 535-36.
147. Court Strikes Down a Portion of New Commercial Speech Restrictions, WASH.
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B. Required Warnings for Cigarettes and Advertisements
Nearly a year after issuance of the Commonwealth Brands decision, the
FDA solicited public comment on how to implement the Tobacco Control
Act.q9 The comment period gave anyone interested in submitting a com-
ment the opportunity to address various issues like new product approval,
advertising and marketing of tobacco products, label statements, label warn-
ings, and many others.150
After receiving more than 1,700 comments,'51 the FDA issued a pro-
posed rule.152 The goal of the Proposed Rule was to modify the warnings, if
necessary, that were to appear on cigarette packages and the color graphic
images showing the negative health consequences of smoking.153 As part of
its preliminary benefits analysis, the FDA estimated "that the U.S. smoking
rate will decrease by 0.212 percentage points" as a result of the new FDA
regulations.154 After making certain changes, the FDA issued its Final Rule
for required warnings on cigarettes packages and advertisements on June 22,
2011 .155 The Final Rule considers three main things: relevant scientific liter-
ature, the public comments, and results from its 18,000-person study.156 The
Final Rule summarizes certain public comments, followed by detailed re-
sponses answering certain important questions or concerns. 57
1. Purpose and Justification of the Final Rule Required
Warnings
The purpose of the Final Rule is to comply with Section 201 of the
Tobacco Control Act, which requires the FDA to issue nine new graphical
images to go along with the nine new textual health-warning statements. 58
The FDA provides extensive discussion and support for the passage of the
149. See Request for Comment on Implementation of the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Control Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,241 (proposed Mar. 19, 2010) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1140).
150. Id. at 13,242-43.
151. Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, U.S. FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Tobacco
Products/Labeling/ucm259214.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
152. See generally Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements
("Proposed Rule"), 75 Fed. Reg. 69,524-01 (proposed Nov. 12, 2010) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. Part 1141).
153. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,633.
154. Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 69,543 (emphasis added).
155. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,628.
156. Overview: Cigarette Health Warnings, supra note 152.
157. See Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,630.
158. Id. at 26,629.
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new tobacco regulations in its Final Rule.159 First, and most importantly, the
Final Rule cites the troubling amount of cigarette usage in the United States,
especially among the youth in grades nine through twelve. 60 The Final Rule
also cites the health consequences of smoking.161 The FDA explains that
cigarette use causes the loss of "approximately 5.1 million years of potential
life" each year.162
One of the other reasons behind the enactment of the new warnings is
the inadequacy of the previous warnings.163 The FDA cites three important
problems with the previous warnings used on cigarette packaging: 1) the
warnings had not been changed in more than twenty-five years; 2) the warn-
ings often went unnoticed; and 3) the warnings "fail[ed] to convey important
relevant information in an effective manner."164 All three of these problems
pointed to the lack of knowledge among consumers of cigarettes about the
negative health consequences of using tobacco.165
Finally, the Final Rule explains how larger, graphic warnings communi-
cate more effectively to consumers.166 It does this by citing other countries'
graphic warnings and the "research literature indicat[ing] that large graphic
health . . . warnings are more likely than text-only warnings to (1) get con-
sumers' attention, (2) influence consumers' awareness regarding cigarette-
related health risks, and (3) affect smoking intentions and behaviors."67 All
of these factors, according to the Final Rule, points to adding new graphic
warnings on cigarette packaging. 168
2. Selection of the Nine Color Graphic Images
When the FDA issued its Proposed Rule to the public, it proposed
thirty-six potential color graphic images to appear with corresponding textual
warnings.169 To come up with the thirty-six color graphic images, the FDA
looked at what "other countries.., required and worked with various experts
in the fields of health communications, marketing research, graphic design,
and advertising."170 Each of the graphic images had one goal in mind: to
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 36,630-31.
162. Id. at 36,630.
163. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,631-32.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 36,631-32.
166. Id. at 36,631.
167. Id. at 36,631 & 36,633.
168. Id. at 36,635.
169. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,636.
170. Id.
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"depict[ ] the negative health consequences of smoking."' 7' The FDA de-
signed the different images to help match up with the textual messages with
which they would be paired.172 The FDA used a research study to:
(1) Measure consumer attitudes, beliefs, and intended behaviors related
to cigarette smoking in response to the proposed color graphic images and
their accompanying textual statements; (2) determine whether consumer re-
sponses to the proposed color graphic images and their accompanying textual
statements differed across various groups based on age, smoking status, or
other demographic variables; and (3) evaluate the relative effectiveness of
the proposed color graphic images and their accompanying textual warnings
statements at conveying information about various health risks of smoking,
and additionally, at encouraging smoking cessation and discouraging smok-
ing initiation.173
The results of the study were directly related to the final selection of the
nine color graphic images accompanying the textual warnings.174 After an
extensive amount of research, studies, and examining the comments submit-
ted, the Final Rule reveals the nine color graphic images selected along with
their matching textual warnings.175 A few of them are below:
176
The Final Rule describes each of the textual warnings and the type of
picture that is placed with it.177 In addition to both the textual warnings and
171. Id.
172. Id. at 36,647.
173. Id. at 36,637-38.
174. Id. at 36,639.
175. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,648.
176. Christine Hsu, Judge Backs Tobacco Companies on FDA-Imposed Health Ef-
forts, MED. DAILY, Feb. 2, 2012, available at http://www.medicaldaily.com/
newsf2Ol 20202/9041/constitution-tobacco-health-safety-advertisment-lorillard-
rj-reynolds-commonwealth-brands-i.htm.
177. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,649-58.
I Smoking (01) kill ycu.U
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
the graphic warnings, all of the new regulated warnings are required to dis-
play, "1 800 QUIT NOW."178
The FDA tries to incorporate all different kinds of images into these
new warnings, but does so with the same goal in mind: to make sure that the
public is fully aware of all of the negative health effects of smoking to-
bacco.179 All of the selected images and textual warnings have both scientific
and public support and were carefully chosen by the FDA.180 The Final Rule
describes how each image is supported in the FDA's research study and the
impact it has on the public.' 8' To be more thorough, the Final Rule also
explains why the other twenty-seven images were not selected.182 Finally,
the Final Rule describes why it failed to include the Surgeon General warn-
ing with the new textual warnings that had been so popular for so many
years. 183
3. Implementation Issues
The passage of the Tobacco Control Act in 2009 allowed the FDA to
create a schedule for implementing the new tobacco regulations.84 On No-
vember 12, 2010, the FDA released the thirty-six proposed graphics for pub-
lic comment.185 When the FDA released its Final Rule on June 22, 2011, the
clock began ticking for tobacco companies to oppose the new regulations;
starting September 22, 2012, cigarettes sold in the United States cannot be
manufactured or advertised without carrying the new cigarette health warn-
ings.186 Most importantly, starting October 22, 2012, cigarette manufacturers
will no longer be able to distribute cigarettes in the United States without the
new cigarette health warnings. 8 7 When the new warnings are introduced, the
Final Rule requires them to be randomly displayed by cigarette manufactur-
ers as equally as possible "so that all of the . . . warnings appear in the
marketplace at the same time."88
The FDA knew that one of the obstacles it would encounter with the
implementation of the new warnings was a claim by tobacco manufacturers
178. Id. at 36,674.
179. Id. at 36,631.
180. Id. at 36,649-58.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 36,657-70.
183. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,672. The Final Rule explains that the Surgeon
General warning is no longer effective.
184. Id. at 36,702-03.
185. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 40.
186. Id. at 41-42.
187. Id. at 42.
188. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,693.
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that the new cigarette packaging requirements violated forced commercial
speech under the First Amendment.89 Consequently, the FDA devotes an
extensive amount of the Final Rule to discussing why the new regulations do
not violate the First Amendment.190 The FDA meticulously responds to
many of the comments brought forth by cigarette manufactures and ada-
mantly denies any constitutional violation.91 The First Amendment section
of the Final Rule is one of the largest discussions concerning the new ciga-
rette regulations.192
A serious issue among both consumers and cigarette manufacturers is
the costs with implementing the new regulations.93 The Final Rule explains
"three main costs to the [tobacco] industry: [t]he cost of changing cigarette
package labels; the cost of conducting market testing for redesigned pack-
ages; and the cost of removing noncompliant point-of-sale advertising."94
Changing cigarette-packaging labels creates a new burden for cigarette man-
ufacturers because they will be incurring costs up front for changing the ]a-
bels.95 Cigarette manufacturers will also face additional costs in making
sure that the various warnings are displayed "equal[ly] and random[ly]," as
required.196 Cigarette manufacturers and retailers will incur the costs associ-
ated with removing noncompliant point-of-sale advertising.97 With in-
creased cigarette prices, however, consumers, will likely share in the costs as
well.198 Additionally, the new warnings may force certain sectors to lose
sales and possibly jobs, even though the FDA states that any revenue or jobs
lost "will be offset by gains to other sectors."199
4. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA 200
It did not take long for tobacco manufacturers to question the constitu-
tionality of the new mandatory graphic and textual warnings. On August 16,
2011, five tobacco companies filed a lawsuit against the FDA over the new
mandatory graphic images.201 "[Tihe second-, third-, and fourth-largest to-
189. ld. at 36,694.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 36,694 to 36,701.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 36,714.
194. Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,714.





200. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36.
201. Id. at 39.
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bacco manufacturers . . . in the United States" were named as plaintiffs,
along with the fifth-largest cigarette manufacturer in the United States.202
The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on August 19, 2011, in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia to prevent the new
packaging requirements from taking effect.203
The court began by examining the appropriate standard of review for
issuing an injunction.204 It cited the four familiar factors many courts use
when determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate: "(1) whether there
is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant
will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; (3) whether the
injunction will substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) whether
the public interest would be furthered by the injunction." 205
The plaintiffs' demand for injunctive relief was not based upon the sub-
stance of the new textual warnings, but that the new required warnings un-
constitutionally compelled speech.206 The plaintiffs believed the "speech
[did] not fit within the 'commercial speech' exception under which ... gov-
ernment-mandated, informational disclosures are evaluated under a less re-
strictive standard."207 Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the Final Rule should
be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard.08 The government countered
by citing Commonwealth Brands, arguing that the facts were analogous and
the court should apply the less restrictive standard.209 The court did not
agree; instead it distinguished the facts from Commonwealth Brands and re-
minded the government that decisions in other district courts were not bind-
ing in that court.2 0 As a result, the court went forward with its analysis of
applying strict scrutiny to the four-factor preliminary injunction test.2 1'
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 42.
205. Id. at 42-43 (quoting Ivax Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, Civil Action No. 04-1603,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29223, at * 1-2 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2004) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
206. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44.
207. Id.; see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
208. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 46.
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5. The Plaintiffs Have a Substantial Likelihood of Success on the
Merits
The court believed that the plaintiffs' success on the merits would ulti-
mately be defined based upon the applied level of scrutiny.212 As such, it
again examined the application of strict scrutiny to the mandated textual and
graphical warnings.23 The court explained that the narrow exception when
examining government-compelled speech only applies where the disclosure
is "purely factual and uncontroversial."214 Here, the court focused on the fact
that some of the graphic images were depictions of cartoons or digitally en-
hanced.215 As a result, the graphic images alone sought to evoke emotion,
and were not purely factual and uncontroversial.216
Because strict scrutiny applied, the government carried the burden of
proving that the new mandated warnings were narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest.217 The government claimed its purpose
behind the new warnings was "to effectively convey the negative health con-
sequences of smoking on cigarette packages and in advertisements."218 How-
ever, the court did not agree that this was the government's purpose.219
Instead of focusing on whether any single graphic warning was going to be
effective on its own terms, the government looked only to the "relative im-
pact of different warnings."220 Therefore, the government's purpose was
"not to inform, but.., to advocate.., change in consumer behavior."22 The
court acknowledged that there was no scenario under which the new man-
dated warnings could be viewed as being narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's purpose.222 This was mainly due to the large size and display
requirements for the graphic images and because the actual content could
have included different graphics, such as a graph showing the difficulty of
consumers who try to quit smoking and those that actually do.223 Based on
212. Id.
213. Id. at 45-46.
214. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 47.
218. Id. at 47 (quoting Def's Opp'n 23 (citation omitted)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
219. Id.
220. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (quoting Defs Opp'n 29) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
221. Id. at 48.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 48-49.
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these factors, the court concluded that the government failed to meet its bur-
den to show a compelling interest or show that its methods were narrowly
tailored and, as a result, concluded that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on
the merits of their claim.224
6. Irreparable Harm
The plaintiffs made two arguments in an attempt to show that the harm
they would suffer if injunctive relief were not granted is "more than simply
irretrievable."225 First, the plaintiffs argued that the financial costs associated
with complying with the regulations during the next 15 months would cost
them tens of millions of dollars as a result of changing their products.226
Second, the plaintiffs argued that they would be unable to recover from the
FDA.227 The court found that, while simple economic harm alone cannot
suffice to prove that the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm, the fact that
they would be unable to recover costs from the FDA does.2 28 If injunctive
relief was not granted, the plaintiffs could be unconstitutionally compelled to
comply with a competing policy agenda at their own expense.229 For that
reason, the plaintiffs demonstrated a threat of irreparable harm and the court
found that this factor weighed in favor of granting injunctive relief.230
7. Injunctive Relief Will Not Substantially Injure Other
Interested Parties, Including the Public
When the court examined the potential injury to other interested parties
and the public, the government argued that "[elach day, nearly 4,000 Ameri-
cans under the age of 18 experiment with cigarettes for the first time, and
approximately 1,000 children become new daily smokers."231 However, the
court did not agree with this "appeal to emotion," and instead looked at
"whether the public will be prejudiced by a temporary delay in the [Final]
Rule's implementation."22 The court looked at the actions of Congress
throughout the regulation process and determined that they did not seem to
be in a hurry to implement the new regulations.233 The court also focused on
the fact that Congress did not seem to address the First Amendment issues,
224. Id. at 49.
225. Id.
226. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
227. Id. at 50.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 51.
230. Id.
231. Id. (Def's Opp'n 43) (internal quotation marks omitted).
232. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
233. Id. at 52.
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despite knowing that it would later be an important question.34 As a result,
the court found that the final two factors weighed in favor of injunctive re-
lief.235 Because all of the factors weighed in favor of granting injunctive
relief to halt the implementation of the Final Rule and its new graphical im-
age and textual warning requirements, the court granted Plaintiffs' temporary
injunction.36
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Commonwealth Brands versus R.J. Reynolds
The recent decisions handed down by the two district courts in Com-
monwealth Brands237 and R.J. Reynolds238 created interesting issues in to-
bacco regulation. Specifically, each court applied a different standard of
review in determining the constitutionality of the Tobacco Control Act's pro-
vision that requires graphic images along with textual warnings to appear on
cigarette packages.239 There are also significant differences in how the two
courts viewed the purpose of the Tobacco Control Act and the FDA's use of
international experience, and the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control .240
1. Proper Standard of Review
In Commonwealth Brands, Judge McKinley applied Central Hudson's
less restrictive standard when he examined the constitutionality of the new
graphic warnings for commercial speech.241 This meant Judge McKinley had
to examine whether the constitutional provision achieved the government's
intended purpose while examining other avenues that were not taken-that
is, other ways that the government could have achieved its goal without vio-
lating the First Amendment.2 42
The plaintiffs did not believe Central Hudson was the appropriate stan-
dard of review and instead argued that strict scrutiny should have applied
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 53.
237. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d.
238. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36.
239. Compare Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531-32, with R.J. Reyn-
olds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 46. See also Kevin Outterson, Smoking and the First
Amendment, 365 N. ENG. J. MED. 2351, 2351-52, Dec. 22, 2011, available at
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/l0.1056/NEJMpI 113011.
240. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2351-52.
241. 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531-32.
242. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2351.
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because the graphic warnings were not purely factual and uncontroversial.243
They believed the government was just trying use them as a mouthpiece to
promote its message that consumers need to stop smoking.244 Judge McKin-
ley did not agree with any of the plaintiffs' arguments, instead focusing on
the fact that "the government's message is objective and has . . . been
[un]controversial for many decades."245 As a result, the new graphic warn-
ings requirements were "well suited" and furthered the purposes of the To-
bacco Control Act.246 By denying the application of strict scrutiny, Judge
McKinley created a much easier path for the government to implement their
new graphic warnings. Although Judge McKinley provided some analysis of
why Central Hudson was the appropriate standard of review,247 he failed to
acknowledge its importance to the central issue of the case.
In contrast, Judge Leon in R.J. Reynolds held that the appropriate stan-
dard of review is strict scrutiny, and that he is very much aware of its impor-
tance.248 Judge Leon acknowledged that, while looking at one of the four
factors for whether a preliminary injunction should be granted, the "plain-
tiffs' likelihood of success on the merits turns on the level of scrutiny that
governs the FDA's Rule mandating textual warnings and graphic images on
cigarette packaging and advertisements."249
Here, as in Commonwealth Brands, the plaintiffs relied on the argument
that the new warnings are not purely factual and uncontroversial to show
why strict scrutiny must apply.250 Judge Leon analyzed the images them-
selves to determine the government's purpose, stating that, since some of the
graphic images "appear to be cartoons, and others appear to be digitally en-
hanced or manipulated," this would seem to contradict any definition of the
warnings as "purely factual."21 Furthermore, Judge Leon believed that "the
graphic images were . . .designed to maximize 'salience' and emotion im-
pact."252 Because of this, the graphic images could not be viewed as purely
factual and uncontroversial, and the government, therefore, carried the bur-
den of demonstrating that the graphic warning requirements are narrowly
tailored to achieve the government's compelling interest.25 3
243. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 530.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 531.
246. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2352.
247. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 530-32.
248. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d 45-46.
249. See id. at 45.
250. Id. at 44-45.
251. Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2352.
253. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 45, 47.
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The different standards of review applied in these cases are imperative
as to whether the Tobacco Contract Act's provision requiring new graphic
warnings will be upheld or struck down as violating the First Amendment.254
The Central Hudson standard applied in Commonwealth Brands allowed the
government to justify its regulations under the commercial speech standard
by simply showing that "the regulation was not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve [their] interest." 255 There is no denying that applying the more
relaxed standard of review played an integral role in why Judge McKinley
upheld the regulation as constitutional. In comparison, the government in
R.J. Reynolds was immediately at a disadvantage due to the strict scrutiny
requirement. In particular, "the sheer size and display requirements" made it
almost impossible for the government to prove that the regulation was nar-
rowly tailored.256 Judge Leon cited many different examples of why the
graphic images could not be viewed as narrowly tailored, and specifically
how the government could have created other reasonable means of achieving
their purpose. 57
If these two cases are appealed to their respective circuit courts, it will
be critical to reach a resolution as to the appropriate standard of review. If
both circuit courts conclude that Central Hudson is appropriate, the new reg-
ulations would likely pass constitutional scrutiny and be upheld. However, if
the circuit courts apply strict scrutiny, the government will have great diffi-
culty establishing that the new regulations are constitutional. If the circuit
courts ultimately disagree about the standard of review, the Supreme Court
will have a very interesting and important issue to address in the coming
years.
2. Purpose of the Tobacco Control Act
An important issue that both Judge McKinley and Judge Leon had to
address when applying their respective standards of review was to determine
the government's actual purpose in passing the new regulation.258 It was
critical to correctly define the government's purpose to determine whether it
was being furthered by the new regulations, and to examine other possible
avenues that could have been taken to achieve that purpose. 259
In Commonwealth Brands, the government argued that its substantial
interest was to warn people about the dangers of smoking.260 The plaintiffs
254. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2351-52.
255. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 521 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas &
Electric Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980)).
256. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
257. Id. at 48-49.
258. Outterson, supra note 241, 2351-52.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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disagreed, claiming that reliable national surveys have revealed that aware-
ness of dangers of using tobacco is widespread and that, if anything, younger
consumers are now overestimating the dangers of tobacco use as compared to
adults.261 Judge McKinley did not agree with this argument or the suggestion
that the government was trying to "browbeat potential tobacco consumers,
including youths, over the head with its anti-tobacco message at the manu-
facturers' expense."62 Instead, Judge McKinley believed the government's
focus was "to ensure that the health risk messages [were] actually seen by
consumers." 263 He relied upon numerous studies that revealed the current
warnings were not effectively communicating the dangers of tobacco use. 264
Reviewing those different studies and reports, Judge McKinley was able to
conceptually justify that the graphic image and space allocation rules are
appropriate.265
In R.J. Reynolds, Judge Leon disagreed with Judge McKinley's analysis
because he felt as though the stated purpose of the government was inconsis-
tent with its arguments and evidence offered in support of the Final Rule.266
Judge Leon relied upon the 18,000-person consumer study conducted by the
FDA to determine which graphic images would create the most awareness
about smoking risks to consumers in ascertaining the government's pur-
pose. 267 The study was designed to "assess[ ] the relative impact of different
warnings based on participants' exposure to one graphic warning on one oc-
casion."268 Judge Leon concluded that the government's purpose was not to
convey the negative health consequences of smoking, but instead "to advo-
cate a change in consumer behavior."269 Judge Leon's logical conclusion
completely changed how he applied strict scrutiny, because the government's
true "compelling interest" differed from its initial argument.
Going forward, the FDA's Final Rule may create a problem due to its
extremely detailed and thorough discussion of how consumers will likely
react to the different graphic images rather than a focus on whether the warn-
ings will appropriately alert people about the dangers of smoking. Judge
McKinley's and Judge Leon's different interpretations of the government's
purpose for regulating the graphic images and the images' space-allocation
261. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (quoting Plaintiffs' Brief
45-46) (citation omitted).
262. Id. at 530.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 530-31.
265. Id. at 531-32.
266. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
267. Id.
268. Id. (emphasis added).
269. Id. at 47-48.
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rules will present another important foundational question to be answered in
determining the constitutionality of the new graphic image requirements.
3. International Experience and the World Health Organization
Framework Convention
Commonwealth Brands and R.J. Reynolds also differ in the judges' dif-
fering attitudes toward international experience and the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control.270 The plaintiffs in both cases challenged
the space allocation rules under the Tobacco Control Act, whereby cigarette
packaging must have updated warnings that occupy the top 50% of both the
front and back panels.271 Both courts also discussed Entertainment Software,
where the Seventh Circuit applied strict scrutiny and struck down a state law
requiring video game retailers to include a small "sexually explicit" warning
on the outside of certain video games. 272 The Seventh Circuit believed that
the warning was too "subjective and highly controversial" to be considered
narrowly tailored and survive strict scrutiny.273 Judge McKinley drew a dis-
tinction between Commonwealth Brands and Entertainment Software by ex-
plaining that Congress properly "provided reasons for [many] particular
features of the warning requirement here," while the state in Entertainment
Software "failed to [show] ... why a smaller warning would be inappropri-
ate."274 Judge McKinley noted that Congress heavily "relied on the interna-
tional consensus found in the World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control," stating that graphic warnings "shall be ro-
tating," "shall be large, clear, visible and legible," "should be 50% or more of
the principal display areas but shall be no less than 30% of the principal
display areas," and "may be in the form of or include pictures or
pictograms."275 The Convention's requirements are legally binding in 174
countries and were largely followed by both Congress and President Barack
Obama in drafting the Tobacco Control Act.276 Judge McKinley used the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and the experiences of
other countries, like Canada, that have had success with graphic warnings to
conclude that the cigarette packaging space allocation rules are necessary. 277
His reliance on these sources will play a large role for the government in
270. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2352.
271. See Tobacco Control Act § 201(a).
272. Entnm't Software, 469 F.3d at 643, 652.
273. Id.
274. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2352.
275. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (citing WHO Framework Con-
vention on Tobacco Control, art. 11.1 (b)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
276. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2353.
277. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
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attempting to justify the strict space allocation rules on cigarette packaging in
the future.
Although Judge McKinley placed a lot of weight on the WHO Tobacco
Control Framework and the successes of other countries, Judge Leon took a
completely different approach.278 Although Judge Leon read Judge McKin-
ley's Commonwealth Brands opinion, he failed to mention the WHO Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control.279 He was also "openly skeptical of
Canadian, English, and Australian experiences with tobacco control." 280 In-
stead, Judge Leon thought the case was analogous to Entertainment Software
because the warnings were more of a "subjective vision of the horrors of
tobacco addiction."281 It is, therefore, impossible for the graphic image regu-
lation to be purely factual and uncontroversial.282
Once again, the distinction between these two courts will likely play a
role in future litigation. Congress substantially relied on the WHO Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control, and on the experiences of other coun-
tries that have successfully implemented graphic warnings.83 Judge
McKinley took a much more conservative approach in Commonwealth
Brands by deferring to the government and its research on the matter. 284
Conversely, Judge Leon did not seem as concerned about the research and
data support, but instead focused on the constitutionality of the graphic im-
age regulation itself.285 In sum, Judge McKinley's approach in Common-
wealth Brands acknowledges the widespread practical problems with tobacco
regulation in present day America and seems motivated to help fix them. He
appears to be more focused on whether there is an actual problem, deferring
to Congress' wisdom where possible. Judge Leon is much more concerned
with protecting the Constitution. He sifted through the government's
"stated" purpose and was able to form his own opinion about the govern-
ment's true goal with the passage of the Tobacco Act, the Final Rule, and the
regulations on cigarette packaging. Judge Leon's constitutional values are
apparent throughout his opinion as he deflects many persuasive arguments
made by the government. In the future, both judges' opinions are likely to be
heavily scrutinized as their respective circuit courts, and possibly the Su-
preme Court, address these various issues.
278. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2353.
279. Outterson, supra note 241, at 2353.
280. Id.
281. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
282. Id.
283. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
284. Id.
285. R.J. Reynolds, 823 F. Supp. 2d at 47-49.
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4. Are Graphic Warnings Really Effective?
One of the interesting issues surrounding the new required graphic
images on cigarette packaging is whether they will even be effective. Al-
though different courts may interpret the government's purpose for enacting
the new legislation differently, it is important to consider whether the graph-
ics will have any impact on consumers. A recent study in the Journal of
Applied Social Psychology considered whether cigarette health warnings
provided any psychological reaction to smokers.286 The purpose of the study
was to try and settle the disagreement among researchers about the psychol-
ogy involved with cigarette health warnings, specifically in relation to the
differences between text-only and graphic warnings.287 The prevailing "view
in the literature is that graphic warnings are an effective tobacco control
strategy."288 However, some researchers viewed past results as flawed be-
cause very little prior research had used an experimental design to illicit reli-
able results.289 Those same researchers believed that graphic warnings that
depicted "scary, fear-arousing messages" could have a "counterproductive
psychological" effect, causing some to react defensively.290
The results of the study ultimately concluded that consumers do indeed
have a higher psychological reaction to graphic warnings as opposed to tex-
tual warnings.291 However, it affirms some previous researchers' skepticism
about the graphic warnings because it actually reveals that they could elicit
"maladaptive psychological responses."292 Studies such as this will be im-
portant in the future when the nine proposed graphic images are scrutinized
more closely in litigation. Some of the images, such as the man with a hole
in his throat or the deceased individual with stitches running down his chest,
could be viewed as offensive and counterproductive. In the future, the FDA
may be forced to re-examine some of the selected graphic images because of
their questionable and unsettling depictions. Studies have shown that graphic
health warnings are effective, but it is important to make sure the correct
images and textual warnings are selected.93
To determine which graphic images would be most effective, the FDA
could examine the successes other countries have had with their own warn-
ings. In Commonwealth Brands, Judge McKinley cited Canadian studies in
286. See Erceg-Hum, supra note 7, at 219.
287. Id. at 219-20.
288. Id. at 220.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 221.
291. Id. at 230.
292. Erceg-Hum, supra note 7, at 232.
293. Nick Wilson, Smokers Respond to Pictorial Health Warnings, 333 SCIENCE
MAGAZINE 822, 822 (Jennifer Sills ed., 2011), available at http://www.
sciencemag.org/content/333/6044/823.2.full.pdf.
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which over fifty percent of Canadian smokers said that they were "more
likely to think about the health risks of smoking" after seeing the new
graphic warnings.294 The United States government may want to analyze and
consider using these types of warnings if their current proposed graphic
images are found unconstitutional.
Other countries have had success similar to that experienced in Canada.
Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean now require graphic
images to appear on cigarette packaging.295 These include diseased body
parts, symbolic images, and testimonial pictures.296 Although these images
are similar to those proposed in the Final Rule, they are not as intrusive. Just
because other countries have followed Canada's lead does not mean they are
not getting push-back from tobacco companies. Tobacco companies across
the world are making many of the same arguments, such as: pictorial-based
warnings harass and scare smokers, such warnings do not work, and they are
unnecessary because smokers already know the health risks associated with
smoking."297 There is little doubt that other governments would not require
all of these new warnings if they did not have scientific evidence supporting
their effectiveness. The United States government could lean on other coun-
tries' successes when trying to find the appropriate graphic warnings to be
placed on cigarette packaging if courts ultimately reject the government's
current proposed images in the Final Rule. In the future, uniform graphic
images could develop to be used globally on all cigarette packaging.
V. CONCLUSION
Tobacco regulation is an ongoing issue in the United States. Time and
time again, the United States government has tried to help the American pub-
lic in understanding the health effects associated with tobacco use. In 1996,
when the United States Supreme Court struck down the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act's attempt to regulate the tobacco industry, tobacco compa-
nies won an important victory in protecting their constitutional rights. How-
ever, this did not deter the government from its ultimate mission. The
passage of the Tobacco Control Act in 2009 created many new tobacco regu-
lations and gives the government another opportunity to protect and educate
the American public. The health risks associated with tobacco use is undeni-
able. Millions of people across the United States and the world suffer from
tobacco-related diseases and deaths. The government has made it a mission
to educate all Americans-young and old, past smokers, current smokers,
294. Commonwealth Brands, 678 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
295. Emesto M Sebri6 et al., Cigarette Labeling Policies in Latin America and the
Caribbean: Progress and Obstacles, 52 MERCADOTECNIA SOCIAL S233, S236
(2010) (Mex.), available at http://www.scielosp.org/pdf/spm/v52s2/a19v52s2.
pdf.
296. Id. at S236-37.
297. Id. at S239.
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and future smokers-about the negative health consequences of using
tobacco.
The future of cigarette packaging remains unclear. Some researchers
have suggested that simple plain packaging should be required.298 This
would standardize the shape, color, and method of opening a package of
cigarettes, while removing all branding.299 Others believe that more focus
should be placed on tobacco "quitlines"-telephone hotlines aimed at help-
ing educate the public about the negative effects of using tobacco.300 In other
words, instead of funding graphic images and warnings, more money should
be placed on increasing quitline awareness, such as the Final Rule's proposal
that new cigarette packaging include "I-800-QUIT-NOW."30 Either way, it
will be intriguing to see what cigarette packaging looks like in the upcoming
years, considering the current litigation and the government's constant focus
on educating the American public.
With the decisions handed down in Commonwealth Brands and R.J.
Reynolds and the FDA's Final Rule, tobacco regulation is a very important
issue in the United States court system. Tobacco manufacturers are kicking
and screaming, claiming that the Tobacco Control Act violates their constitu-
tional rights. It is likely that this disagreement between the government and
tobacco manufacturers will eventually be settled through the Supreme Court,
where it will be forced to weigh tobacco manufacturers' constitutional pro-
tections of commercial speech with the need to overhaul tobacco regulation.
298. Marcus R. Munaf6 et al., Plain Packaging Increases Visual Attention to Health
Warnings on Cigarette Packs in Non-Smokers and Weekly Smokers But Not
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102 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 72, 72 (2010), available at http://jnci.
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